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Under the rules of the Telecommunications Act of 1996,
incumbent local exchange carriers, including Verizon, were obligated to
lease parts of their local telecommunications network to any firm, at
"cost plus a reasonable profit"prices, that could combine them at will,
add retailing services, and sell local telecommunication service as a
rival to the incumbent. AT&T, an entrant into the local
telecommunications market, leased parts of Verizon's network. Curtis
Trinko, a local telecommunications services customer of AT&T, sued
Verizon, alleging various anti-competitive actions of Verizon against
AT&T, including that Verizon raised the costs of AT&T, its
downstream retail rival. The Supreme Court held that Trinko's
complaint failed to state a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act
and dismissed the complaint. I argue that Verizon had two monopolies
in local telecommunications a monopoly of the local
telecommunications network, as well as a monopoly in retail local
telecommunications services. The Telecommunications Act of 1996
allowed for competition in retail services and imposed cost-based
pricing on leases of Verizon's network. Verizon, unable to increase the
lease price on its network, reverted to raising-rivals-costs strategies
against its retail competitors. Thus, Verizon used its monopoly of the
network infrastructure to disadvantage entrants in retail. In doing so,
Verizon lost short-term profits that it would have earned from leasing
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its network to entrants, since the Telecommunications Act of 1996 had
set the lease price at "cost plus a reasonable profit." According to the
sacrifice principle, a defendant is liable if its conduct "involves a
sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only insofar
as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly power." Thus, if
the "sacrifice principle" is applied, Verizon is liable.
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The Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, a law partnership in
Brooklyn, New York, bought local telecommunications services from
American Telephone & Telegraph Company (AT&T). AT&T was
providing these services by combining leased parts of the Verizon local
telecommunications network (unbundled network elements, or UNEs)
and adding retail services of its own, such as billing and marketing.1
Trinko sued Verizon for raising the costs of its retail rival AT&T (who
had entered the market as a competitive local exchange carrier) and
otherwise disadvantaging AT&T through anti-competitive conduct
(including discrimination in fulfilling customer transfer orders to
entrants) under section 2 of the Sherman Act.2
The district court dismissed all the claims brought by Trinko
and accepted the defendant's view that a breach of the interconnection
agreement between Verizon and a competitive local exchange carrier
1. See generally Nicholas Economides, The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its
Impact, 11 JAPAN & WORLD ECON. 456-67 (1999) (providing an overview of the
Telecommunications Act of 1966 and its provisions requiring the leasing of UNEs).
2. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
404-05 (2004). Trinko originally sued NYNEX, which was later bought by Bell Atlantic. Id.
at 402. A second Bell Atlantic merger created Verizon. Id.
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(LEC) should be remedied through an administrative process. 3 The
district court also noted that antitrust litigation would disrupt the
regulatory process of implementing the Telecommunications Act of
1996 (the 1996 Act).4 The Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
reversed, stating that it was "unlikely that allowing antitrust suits
would substantially disrupt the regulatory proceedings mandated by
the Telecommunications Act."5 The Second Circuit observed:
While ideally, the regulatory process alone would be enough to bring competition to
the local phone service markets, it is possible that the antitrust laws will be needed
to supplement the regulatory scheme, especially with respect to injury caused to
consumers.
6
The decision of the Second Circuit to allow the antitrust claim to
continue to trial implies that Verizon's failure to lease parts of its local
network to rivals according to the rules of the 1996 Act could result in
liability for monopolization if all the facts were proven at trial. The
Supreme Court, however, decided that Trinko failed to state a claim
under section 2 of the Sherman Act and dismissed the complaint. 7
The Supreme Court gave no weight to the key vertical issue in
Trinko. Verizon had two monopolies in local telecommunications: a
monopoly of the local telecommunications network infrastructure
(NET), as well as a monopoly in retail services.8 These two monopolies
were vertically related. That is, to provide local telecommunications
services, a firm needed to combine the use of the local NET with retail
3. See Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 93
(2d Cir. 2002) (citing Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atl. Corp., 123 F. Supp.
2d 738, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2000)).
4. See id.
5. Id. at 111.
6. Id. at 112.
7. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
416 (2004). See section 2 of the Sherman Act, defining "monopolization" and "attempting to
monopolize":
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or
conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade or
commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations, shall be deemed
guilty of a felony, and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not
exceeding $10,000,000 if a corporation, or, if any other person, $350,000, or by
imprisonment not exceeding three years, or by both said punishments, in the
discretion of the court.
15 U.S.C. § 2 (2000) (amended 2004).
8. See generally Nicholas Economides et al., Quantifying the Benefits of Entry into
Local Phone Service (NET Inst., Working Paper No. 05-08, 2006), available at
http://www.stern.nyu.edu/networks/LocalTelecommunications.pdf (discussing the 1996
Act's effect on incumbent monopolist Verizon and consumer welfare).
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services. 9  Moreover, retail services alone had no value unless
combined with the use of the local NET.
The 1996 Act allowed entrants to lease any part of the
incumbent's (Verizon's) local NET at "cost plus a reasonable profit."10
AT&T and a number of other companies leased parts of its local NET
from Verizon, and became Verizon's competitors in providing retail
services to customers like Trinko. 11 As we will see, Verizon leveraged
its monopoly of the local NET by raising the costs or decreasing the
quality of services of rival local telecommunications services providers
so that such rivals were disadvantaged. 12 Verizon's incentive to raise
the costs of its retail rivals was to preserve its monopoly in the retail
part of local telecommunications services.
By raising the costs of retail rivals, Verizon lowered the
number of leases of unbundled network elements bought by retail
rivals, thus incurring a revenue sacrifice because Verizon's lease
prices were guaranteed by regulation to be above cost. 13 The fact that
Verizon incurred a short-term revenue sacrifice as a direct effect of its
actions (in raising the costs or decreasing the quality of services of
rival local telecommunications retailers) is an indication that the
actions must have benefited Verizon in the long run by foreclosing
competition. Thus, it may be inferred that Verizon's actions, resulting
in the sacrifice of short-term profits, were anti-competitive.
The fundamental problem occurs when a multi-product
monopolist has an obligation to sell to companies a product or service
that the buyer may combine with products of their own to sell as
substitutes to other products that the monopolist sells. Thus, the
crucial issue is about compelling a monopolist to sell outputs that are
used as inputs by rivals of the monopolist in other markets.
A number of observations are in order. First, such a situation
is not uncommon; multi-product monopolists are prevalent in many
industries.14  Buyers are often companies that combine the
9. See Nicholas Economides, The Economics of Networks, 14 IN'L J. OF INDUS. ORG.
673, 675 (1996).
10. See Nicholas Economides et al., supra note 8, at 1.
11. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402.
12. See infra Part II.
13. See infra Part II.
14. Telecommunications companies typically produce a large number of products,
such as local phone calls, long-distance phone calls, international phone calls, call waiting,
call forwarding, and many other services. Many of these services are complementary to
each other, such as local access and long-distance. Multiproduct firms are also common in
other industries. In computer software, Microsoft is a dominant firm in operating systems
for personal computers and also provides a variety of complementary goods, such as
software applications and computer languages that help programmers produce software.
HIT AND MISS
monopolist's outputs and sell related products. Second, in the absence
of price discrimination, bundling considerations, or competition with
the monopolist in some other market, the monopolist would prefer to
sell at a monopoly price than not sell at all. Third, under the same
conditions, the monopolist prefers to sell at a price that exceeds unit
cost rather than not sell at all.15 It follows that a monopolist that
refuses to sell, and therefore, sacrifices short-term profits, must be
guided by a long-run benefit that it would receive if, through its
actions, competitors are foreclosed or otherwise disadvantaged. These
actions would be anti-competitive. Additionally, strategies by the
multi-product monopolist that raise rivals' costs can have the same
effect on competition as a refusal to deal in the required input. A
regulated multi-product monopolist may have a greater incentive to
resort to raising rivals' costs strategies when regulation prevents it
from setting monopoly prices.
Part I of this article puts the Trinko case in the context of the
continuing deregulation in the telecommunications sector. I discuss
the breakup of AT&T in 1981 and the wisdom of the imposition of line-
of-business restrictions on the local monopolists coming out of the old
AT&T so that they would not foreclose long-distance competitors.
Additionally, I discuss the major provisions of the 1996 Act and how
they apply to Trinko. Part II discusses the Supreme Court's decision
in Trinko and various problems that arise after close examination of
the decision. Part III discusses the profit "sacrifice principle" and its
application in Trinko. Part IV has concluding remarks.
I. THE TRINKO CASE IN THE CONTEXT OF TELECOMMUNICATIONS
DEREGULATION
The Trinko case is best understood in the context of the
evolution of telecommunications markets in the United States. After
See Richard A. D'Aveni, Business Insight (A Special Report)-Leaders of the Pack: A Look
at Strategies for Securing Market Domination--and Keeping It, WALL ST. J., Mar. 3, 2007,
at R9. Google, a dominant firm in computer search, also provides word-processing and
spreadsheet software, among others. See Vauhini Vara & Kevin J. Delaney, Google,
Salesforce.com Weigh Alliance to Battle Microsoft, WALL ST. J., May 21, 2007, at B4. Apple,
a dominant firm in online music sales, is also a monopolist in the portable player (iPod)
where the music it sells can be played. See Siobhan Hughes, Apple Gets Vote of Confidence
for iTunes from Antitrust Chief, WALL ST. J., Sep. 14, 2006, at B5.
15. A firm makes a positive profit when selling above its unit cost (average cost).
Therefore, in the absence of considerations stated in the text, it is not profit-maximizing to
refuse to sell at a price that is above average cost.
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a multi-year suit by the U.S. Department of Justice, 16 AT&T agreed to
be broken into eight pieces: AT&T itself, which retained the long-
distance lines, the Western Electric equipment division, and most of
Bell Laboratories; and seven Regional Bell Operating Companies
(RBOCs), each of which retained a monopoly in its region for local
telecommunications services. 17 The logic of the 1981 AT&T breakup
was that, given the technology at that time, competition was
economically feasible in long-distance telecommunications services but
uneconomic in local telecommunications service.18 The local NET was
considered to have been too expensive to replicate compared to the
revenues that it could create, especially from residential and small
business customers. Thus, under the assumption that local
telecommunications was a natural monopoly, the Department of
Justice allowed each RBOC to remain a monopolist in local
telecommunications in its geographic region.1 9
The Modification of Final Judgment that finalized the AT&T
breakup imposed line-of-business restrictions that prevented RBOCs
from entering the long-distance market.20 This was because of the key
vertical concern that is also the crucial issue in the Trinko case. Long-
distance calls require local access origination and local access
termination.21 These two services were under the control of a legal
monopolist RBOC in the period from 1981-1996. If an RBOC was
allowed to provide long-distance service as well, it could implement a
16. See generally United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 642 F.2d 1285, 1288-90 (D.C.
Cir. 1980) (detailing the background and procedural history of the Government's civil
antitrust suit against AT&T).
17. The RBOCs were Ameritech, Bell Atlantic, Bell South, NYNEX, Pacific Telesis,
Southwestern Bell, and U.S. West. Richard A. Epstein, Takings, Commons, and
Associations: Why the Telecommunications Act of 1996 Misfired, 22 YALE J. ON REG. 315,
343 n.84 (2005).
18. Interviews with William F. Baxter, former Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust
Div. of the U.S. Dep't of Justice at Stanford University, January 1989.
19. See id. (discussing the belief that, at the time of the breakup, local
telecommunications companies were natural monopolies); see also Roger G. Noll & Bruce
M. Owen, The Anticompetitive Uses of Regulation: United States v. AT&T, in THE
ANTITRUST REVOLUTION 290, 313-15 (John E. Kwoka, Jr. & Lawrence J. White eds., 1989)
(detailing the factors considered by the Government when deciding to create the seven regional
companies).
20. See United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 188 (D.D.C. 1982)
("The proposed decree prohibits the divested Operating Companies from providing
interexchange services. This restriction is clearly necessary to preserve free competition in
the interexchange market."), affd sub nom. Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001
(1983). "Interexchange carriers" are also known as long-distance carriers. See Verizon Tel.
Cos. v. F.C.C., 269 F.3d 1098, 1101 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
21. See Nicholas Economides, Telecommunications Regulation: An Introduction, in
THE LIMITS OF MARKET ORGANIZATION 56-57 (Richard R. Nelson ed., 2005).
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"vertical price squeeze" against its pure long-distance rivals, to be
discussed in detail below. 22 In a vertical price squeeze, a firm, say
Firm 1, produces two goods A and B. Good B requires A to be of value.
Firm 1 is a monopolist in A, but faces competition in good B. A
vertical price squeeze occurs when, by manipulating the price of A and
possibly the price of B, the monopolist (Firm 1) reduces the revenues
of independent producers of B, so that they are driven out of business
or marginalized.
As a result of the vertical price squeeze, the profits of a pure
long-distance carrier can be diminished to the point that it is
foreclosed from the market.23  In other words, in 1981 it was
understood that allowing RBOCs in long-distance would result in
them leveraging their monopoly power from local markets into the
long-distance market. This, in turn, would foreclose long-distance
competitors and diminish competition in the long-distance services
market.24 To preserve and enhance competition in long-distance, the
district court imposed restrictions that prevented RBOCs from
providing long-distance service.25
22. See infra Part I.A.
23. See Economides, supra note 21, at 57.
24. As the Modification of Final Judgment notes, in the presence of line of business
restrictions there will be no incentive or ability for AT&T or the RBOCs to engage in the
anticompetitive conduct alleged:
[T]he ability of AT&T to engage in anticompetitive conduct stems largely from its
control of the local Operating Companies. Absent such control, AT&T will not
have the ability to disadvantage competitors in the interexchange and equipment
markets.
For example, with the divestiture of the Operating Companies AT&T will not be
able to discriminate against intercity competitors, either by subsidizing its own
intercity services with revenues from the monopoly local exchange services, or by
obstructing its competitors' access to the local exchange network. The local
Operating Companies will not be providing interexchange services, and they will
therefore have no incentive to discriminate. Moreover, AT&T's competitors will
be guaranteed access that is equal to that provided to AT&T, and intercity
carriers therefore will no longer be presented with the problems that confronted
them in that area.
Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. at 165. The court further noted:
AT&T will no longer have the opportunity to provide discriminatory
interconnection to competitors. The Operating Companies will own the local
exchange facilities. Since these companies will not be providing interexchange
services, they will lack AT&T's incentive to discriminate. Moreover, they will be
required to provide all interexchange carriers with exchange access that is "equal
in type, quality, and price to that provided to AT&T and its affiliates."
Id. at 171-72.
25. See id. at 188.
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A. Vertical Price Squeeze and Raising Rivals' Costs Leading to
Foreclosure
To understand the usefulness of line-of-business restrictions in
preventing anti-competitive behavior, consider a good that is
comprised of two complementary parts: AB and BC. Assume that both
parts are necessary for the good to have value. Further, assume that
AB is monopolized while BC is competitive. This example replicates
the 1981 AT&T breakup, if AB represents local originating access for a
phone call and BC represents long-distance transmission.26 Two
industry structures will be compared. In the first industry structure-
with line of business restrictions-the monopolist of AB is not allowed
to participate in the BC market. In the second industry structure-
without line-of-business restrictions-the monopolist of AB is allowed
to enter the BC market.
When there are line of business restrictions, AB, representing
originating access (O.ACCESS), is provided by the local monopolist, and
BC, representing the long-distance transmission (LD.TRANSMISSION), is
provided by the competitive long-distance sector. The price (PABc) of
the good ABC, the long-distance call, is the sum of the price of
originating access and long-distance transmission:
PABC = PO.ACCESS + PLD.TRANSMISSION.
When there are no line-of-business restrictions on the local monopolist
of AB, it will also provide BC in competition with other long-distance
companies providing BC. Now, the local monopolist can control both
the price of the composite good ABC, as well as the price of AB-
originating access-when sold to its BC rival. As such, a pure long-
distance company that produces only BC would receive as revenue for
its long-distance transmission:
PABC - PO.ACCESS.
Thus, the AB monopolist can "squeeze" the revenue of a pure long-
distance carrier to a very small amount.
Setting any price for originating access above its cost would
disadvantage the long-distance rival.27 Since the local monopolist
26. A full analysis would require an additional service CD, also monopolized, which
in the telecommunications context would be termination access. Because AB and CD play
the same role, it is sufficient to analyze the model disregarding CD.
27. Access fees have been typically set at very high prices compared to cost with the
regulatory objective of subsidizing basic service. See Economides, supra note 1, at 457; see
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charges itself its own cost for originating access, even a small
deviation of the price of originating access above its cost will result in
foreclosure of an equally efficient long-distance rival when the final
products are homogeneous. This is called a "vertical price squeeze."
The wisdom of the line-of-business restrictions is that they avoid this
result.
The previous example depended on the assumption that the AB
monopolist could set PO.ACCESS above cost. Perfect regulation would set
this price at cost. Even then, in the absence of line of business
restrictions, the local monopolist can foreclose pure long-distance
rivals if it can implement raising rivals' costs (RRC) strategies, such
as delays and quality decreases, against its rivals. To show this,
suppose that the local monopolist (LOCAL.MONOPOLIST) can implement
RRC strategies that increase the effective cost (C) of access by its
rivals above the costs for such services.
LOCAL.MONOPOLIsTP.RRCO.ACCESS > LOCAL.MONOPOLISTCO.ACCESS.
The price when an opponent raises rivals' costs (P.RRC) represents
the effective price of the monopolized input to a downstream rival
when the upstream monopolist uses a strategy that raises the costs of
rivals or reduces their quality. LOCAL.MONOPOLISTP.RRCO.ACCESS is the
effective cost of access origination faced by long-distance service rivals
as a result of the local monopolist's RRC actions.
Assume that a long-distance company, like AT&T, has the
same cost of long-distance transmission as the local monopolist
because the two are equally efficient:
AT&TPLD. TRANSMISSION = LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPLD.TRANSMISSION.
Faced with higher effective cost for access origination, equally efficient
long-distance rivals will have to charge a higher price (AT&TPABc) for
the final service than the local monopolist's price (LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPABC)
and will therefore be foreclosed from the long-distance market:
also United States v. W. Elec. Co., 846 F.2d 1422, 1425 (D.C. Cir. 1988) (noting that since
divestiture, the FCC has used high access charges to "compel[] interexchange service users
to pay more than the cost ... and thus to subsidize local telephone service users").
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AT&TPABC = LOCAL.MONOPOLISTP.RRC.ACCESS + AT&TPLD. TRANSMISSION =
LOCAL.MONOPOLISTP.RRCO.ACCESS + LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPLD. TRANSMISSION
LOCAL.MONOPOLISTCO.ACCESS + LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPLD. TRANSMISSION -
LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPABC.
Therefore, when the local monopolist implements RRC strategies,
AT&T is forced to sell its long-distance service above the price at
which the vertically integrated local monopolist sells it:
AT&TPABC > LOCAL.MONOPOLISTPABC.
Thus, in the absence of line-of-business restrictions, even under
perfect price regulation, a local monopolist can implement RRC
strategies that disadvantage, and even foreclose, downstream rivals.
In summary, understanding that a vertical price squeeze and
RRC strategies can diminish competition in long-distance, the
government in 1981 required that RBOCs not be allowed to offer long-
distance service. Without line-of-business restrictions, a monopolist
that sells an input required by his downstream competitors can
diminish competition in a downstream market by using price
discrimination and RRC strategies. This applies directly to Verizon's
alleged behavior in Trinko.
B. The Telecommunications Act of 1996 and its Implementation
The Telecommunications Act of 1996 was a brave attempt to
introduce competition in all telecommunications markets. 2 Congress
understood that it was uneconomic for firms to enter into local
telecommunications by replicating the local network infrastructure of
the incumbents. 29  Thus, the 1996 Act set up two additional
28. See Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 402 (2004); Economides, supra note 21, at 60.
29. See In the Matter of Implementation of the Local Competition Provisions in the
Telecommunications Act of 1996, 11 F.C.C.R. 15,499, 15,508-09 (1996) [hereinafter Local
Competition Order], vacated in part sub nom. California v. F.C.C., 124 F.3d 934 (8th Cir.
1997), rev'd in part sub nom. AT & T Corp. v. Iowa Utils. Bd., 525 U.S. 366 (1999), and aff'd
in part, rev'd in part sub nom. Verizon Commc'ns Inc. v. F.C.C., 535 U.S. 467 (2002). The
FCC pointed out:
Because an incumbent LEC currently serves virtually all subscribers in its local
serving area, an incumbent LEC has little economic incentive to assist new
entrants in their efforts to secure a greater share of that market. An incumbent
LEC also has the ability to act on its incentive to discourage entry and robust
competition by not interconnecting its network with the new entrant's network
or by insisting on supracompetitive prices or other unreasonable conditions for
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possibilities for entrants (besides entering with their own facilities): (i)
to enter by leasing parts of the incumbents' local NET, known as
unbundled network elements (UNEs) 30 and (ii) to enter by buying in
wholesale the incumbents' services and reselling them. 31 The most
important avenue to entry was leasing all the UNEs (known
collectively as UNE-platform, or UNE-P), combining the UNE-P with
the entrant's retail services (such as marketing and billing), and then
selling local service to final consumers. 32 To facilitate entry, the 1996
Act set the price for UNEs at "cost plus a reasonable profit."33 The
1996 Act further mandated that unbundled network elements be sold
at "rates, terms, and conditions that are just, reasonable, and
nondiscriminatory." 34 In an additional effort to facilitate entry, the
1996 Act also imposed the requirement on an incumbent to allow for
physical collocation of equipment at its premises, 35 and on all
companies the duty to provide number portability so that consumers
could keep their phone numbers if they changed local service
providers.36
The Federal Communications Commission (FCC) adopted the
long-run, forward-looking economic cost as the measure of appropriate
costs, or Total Element Long Run Incremental Costs (TELRIC).
37
TELRIC is the sum of the costs for all economically efficient inputs
required to supply to the UNEs, 38 and has the following features: (1) it
terminating calls from the entrant's customers to the incumbent LEC's
subscribers.
Congress addressed these problems in the 1996 Act by mandating that the most
significant economic impediments to efficient entry into the monopolized local
market must be removed. The incumbent LECs have economies of density,
connectivity, and scale; traditionally, these have been viewed as creating a
natural monopoly. As we pointed out in our NPRM, the local competition
provisions of the Act require that these economies be shared with entrants.
Id.
30. See 47 U.S.C. §§ 251(c)(3), 251(c)(6) (2000); Local Competition Order, supra note
29, at 16,209-13 (defining key UNEs such as "local loop," "local switching," and "interoffice
transmission facilities"); see also id. at 15,509 ("The Act contemplates three paths of entry
into the local market-the construction of new networks, the use of unbundled elements of
the incumbent's network, and resale.").
31. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(4)(A); Local Competition Order, supra note 29, at 15,516-
17.
32. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
33. Id. § 252(d)(1).
34. Id. § 251(c)(3).
35. Local Competition Order, supra note 29, at 15,515; see 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(6).
36. Local Competition Order, supra note 29, at 15,511 n.l; see 47 U.S.C. §
251(b)(2).
37. Local Competition Order, supra note 29, at 15,844; see also id. at 15,844-56
(describing the TELRIC methodology).
38. Id. at 16,218.
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is a forward-looking economic cost; (2) it is the least cost to provide the
service; (3) it is a long-run cost; (4) it is an incremental cost; (5) it
includes a competitive return on capital; (6) it excludes monopoly
rents; (7) it excludes cross subsidies of any kind; and (8) it reflects cost
differences among geographic regions.3
9
Prices based on TELRIC plus a reasonable profit, as mandated
by the 1996 Act, for leasing of UNEs, are clearly above the present
cost of the local NET.40 The present cost of the local NET reflects the
cost of present-day resources that would be necessary to construct
such a network.41 Thus, from an economic point of view, it is the
appropriate cost measure and it was correctly adopted by the FCC.
42
The incumbent LECs had argued that the appropriate cost
measure would be the historic or "embedded" cost of the network; that
is, the historic cost of the network whenever it was constructed.
43
However, the historic construction cost of the network does not
generally correspond to the cost of present-day resources to construct
such a network. 44 There could be many reasons for this, and I will
highlight two that show how inappropriate it would be to use historic
costs as the standard, especially in the case of local
telecommunications.
First, technological change implies very significant cost
reductions in the provision of telecommunications services.45  For
example, a key function in telecommunications is "switching" and
"routing" calls. 46 Since the 1950s, this has been done by computers,
where technological progress has been tremendous. To say that the
appropriate cost today of a present-day personal computer is billions
of dollars because producing a computer with the corresponding
computing power would cost that much in 1960 is totally absurd. The
39. See id. at 16,218-19.
40. See id. at 15,813.
41. See id. at 16,218.
42. The FCC did not calculate the cost of the most efficient current network.
Instead, it allowed for the locations of switches and central offices of the incumbents to be
fixed and calculated the cost of creating a present-day network given these locations. Since
these locations could also be optimized in the most efficient network, the cost of the
network as calculated by the FCC was in fact higher than that of the most efficient
network. Because it kept the old locations of switches and central offices fixed, the network
design approved by the FCC has been called a "scorched node" network design. See id.
43. See id. at 15,835-36.
44. See id. at 15,821.
45. See Economides, supra note 21, at 48.
46. A call originating from a customer A intended for customer B is typically routed
to a switching center at the offices of a local telephone company where a "switch" (these
days a large computer) directs it to its destination B.
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incumbents' proposal of using historic costs in the face of fast
technological change is equally absurd.
Second, telecommunications companies were regulated for a
significant period according to "rate of return regulation."47 Under
such regulation, a company was guaranteed to recover its network
infrastructure investments. 48 The rate of return was set by the
regulator, and the company adjusted its capital base and prices so that
its profits would not exceed the capital base times the rate of return.
49
An expansion of the capital base by even one dollar increased the
allowed profits. Since this regulation guarantees recovery of
investment and allows for expansion of profits when the capital base is
increased, it is clear that regulated telecommunications companies
had incentives to keep their capital bases high. Thus, the incumbent
LECs have historically kept their capital bases high. The key element
of their capital base is the local network infrastructure. 50 Therefore,
even if historical costs were the appropriate measure of costs (which
they are not), the historical costs of the incumbents would have to be
adjusted significantly downward because of the distortions caused by
the rate of return regulation.
5 1
The 1996 Act also allowed entry of RBOCs in the long-distance
market, once they fulfilled various requirements related to opening
their local markets to competition.52 From the point of view of an
RBOC, long-distance entry was supposed to be the reward for allowing
competition in the local exchange and losing its local exchange
monopoly. 53 The 1996 Act was based on the assumption that the
individual private incentives of the RBOCs would be sufficient to lead
them to open local markets to competition. However, the 1996 Act did
not impose penalties for delays in implementation or non-compliance.
The lack of penalties has proved to be a very serious deficiency of the
47. See Harvey Averch & Leland L. Johnson, Behavior of the Firm Under
Regulatory Constraint, 52 AM. ECON. REV. 1052, 1053-69 (1962); see also Noll & Owen,
supra note 19, at 299-301 (outlining the steps regulators take to establish rates of return).
48. See id.
49. See id.
50. AT&T long-distance repeatedly adjusted its book value downward after
competition developed in the long-distance market to eliminate the distortion caused by the
rate of return regulation to the book value it inherited. The RBOCs and General Telephone
and Electronics (GTE) have not adequately done so.
51. Moreover, it is likely that incumbent LECs have already recovered the original
cost of the vast majority of the physical plant that was in place by 1996.
52. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 412 (2004); see also 47 U.S.C. § 271 (2000) (detailing the necessary prerequisites for
entry into the long-distance market).
53. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 412. ("To be allowed to enter the long-distance market
in the first place, an incumbent LEC must be on good behavior in its local market.").
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1996 Act. 54  Congress thought that the "carrot" of entry in long-
distance would be a sufficient reward for RBOCs to open their local
network. Recent history has shown, however, that Congress erred in
this assumption. The RBOCs' behavior showed that they preferred
not to open their local network and would rather pay the price of
staying out of long-distance for a while.
Implementation of the 1996 Act was very slow because of a
variety of legal challenges and long delays in the creation of electronic
and other systems that would allow large numbers of accounts to be
moved across local telecommunications carriers in a way similar to the
practice in long-distance. 55 There were also significant allegations of
various acts by incumbent monopolists to either raise the costs of their
rivals or lower the quality of services. 56  These acts included
disconnection of service for a few days for customers who were
switching telecommunications companies.
57
Besides litigation resulting from the implementation of the
1996 Act, the FCC rules were challenged by the RBOCs and GTE.
The Supreme Court invalidated a portion of the FCC's first set of rules
in AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Board.58 The Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit invalidated much of the second set of FCC rules in United
States Telecom Ass'n v. Federal Communications Commission.59 The
54. See Economides, supra note 21, at 60 (arguing that Congress's "carrot" of entry
into long-distance was insufficient to induce the RBOCs to "open their local networks").
55. See id. at 66.
56. See, e.g., Re Commissions Own Motion into Monitoring Performance of
Operations Support Systems, No. 01-05-087, 2001 WL 1033406, at *1-2 (Cal. P.U.C. May
24, 2001) (detailing a Joint Partial Settlement Agreement adopted to establish reasonable
standards and mechanisms to ensure compliance with the Telecommunications Act of
1996); MCI Telecomms. Corp. v. Pac. Bell, No. 96-02-014, 1997 WL 868373, at § 2 (Cal.
P.U.C. Sept. 24, 1997) (dismissing a complaint alleging that Pacific Bell refused to disclose
information necessary to change customers' local exchange service from Pacific Bell to
MCI). Additionally, the Trinko case itself was based on facts emerging from an earlier New
York Public Service Commission investigation of violations by Verizon's predecessor
NYNEX of its interconnection agreement with AT&T. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402-03.
NYNEX paid $10 million to AT&T and other competitors for losses arising from violations
of its interconnection agreement. Id. at 404.
57. See MCI Telecomms. Corp., 1997 WL 868373, at § 7.2.2.
58. 525 U.S. 366, 397 (1999). The Court invalidated FCC Rule 319, which was the
"primary unbundling rule [setting] forth a minimum number of network elements that
incumbents must make available to requesting carriers." Id. at 376.
59. 290 F.3d 415, 430 (D.C. Cir. 2002) (rejecting the FCC's "Line Sharing Order"
and "Local Competition Order" in light of the "Commission's naked disregard of the
competitive context").
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FCC consolidated the remand with its second triennial review of the
rules implementing the 1996 Act.
60
Subsequent litigation focused on the issue of "impairment," as
described in § 251(d)(2)(B) of the 1996 Act. 61 Section 251(d)(2) reads:
(2) In determining what network elements should be made available for purposes
of subsection (c)(3) of this section, the Commission shall consider, at a minimum,
whether-
(A) access to such network elements as are proprietary in nature is necessary;
and
(B) the failure to provide access to such network elements would impair the
ability of the telecommunications carrier seeking access to provide the services
that it seeks to offer.
After losing its first appeal, the FCC defined impairment as follows:
an entrant competitive LEC would "be impaired when lack of access to
an incumbent [LEC] network element poses a barrier or barriers to
entry, including operational and economic barriers, that are likely to
make entry into a market uneconomic."6 2 In the appeal of the second
triennial review of the FCC, referred to generally as the USTA II
decision, the D.C. Circuit struck down the FCC's findings that
entrants would be impaired nationwide with respect to mass market
switching. 63 As a result of this decision and the FCC's subsequent
order on remand,6 4 RBOCs do not have to set up new leases of the
"local switching" unbundled network element at prices that reflect cost
plus a reasonable profit.
As an immediate consequence of USTA II, AT&T, the largest
long-distance carrier, stopped marketing both local and long-distance
service to residential customers. 65  MCI, the second-largest long-
distance carrier, acted similarly without a formal announcement.
66
60. See In the Matter of Review of the Section 251 Unbundling Obligations of
Incumbent Local Exchange Carriers, 18 F.C.C.R. 16,978 (2003) [hereinafter Triennial
Review Order] (noting the Commission's decision that, "in light of the rapid changes in
technology and competition, it would reexamine the national list of UNEs in three years,
thereby establishing the Triennial Review process reflected in this Order"), errata 18
F.C.C.R. 19,020 (2003), vacated in part, dismissed in part sub nom. U.S. Telecom Ass'n v.
F.C.C. 359 F.3d 554 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
61. 47 U.S.C. § 251(d)(2) (2000).
62. Triennial Review Order, supra note 60, at 17,035.
63. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. FCC, 359 F.3d 554, 594 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
64. See In the Matter of Unbundled Access to Network Elements, 20 F.C.C.R. 2533,
2641 (2005) (modifying the FCC's regulatory approach so as to eliminate § 251's
"unbundling requirement[s] for mass market local circuit switching nationwide").
65. See Ken Belson, The Diminishing Bell: The Overview; AT&T Won't Seek New
Residential Customers, N.Y. TIMES, July 23, 2004, at Al.
66. See Catherine Yang et al., Will Unleashing the Baby Bells Serve to Heighten
Competition-or Stifle It?, BUS. WK., June 28, 2004, at 98.
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Since then, SBC, the largest local telecommunications services
company, has acquired AT&T, and Verizon, the second-largest local
telecommunications services company, has acquired MCI. 67 These
mergers represent a significant reduction in the number and
capabilities of independent long-distance competitors, which may even
result in price increases in long-distance service.
On balance, the 1996 Act failed in its main objectives. It failed
to create competition in local telecommunications. It also failed to
guard against the RBOCs leveraging their monopoly power in the
long-distance market. As a result of the 1996 Act's failure to prevent
RBOCs from leveraging their monopoly power in the long-distance
market, the largest pure long-distance companies were practically
driven out of the residential long-distance market, followed by
acquisitions of AT&T and MCI by the upstream monopolists.
II. THE SUPREME COURT DECISION IN TRINKO
The Supreme Court's Trinko decision had four parts. Part I
described the complaint and procedural history of the case. 68 Part II
considered "what effect (if any) the 1996 Act has upon the application
of traditional antitrust principles,"69 and concluded that "the 1996 Act
preserves claims that satisfy existing antitrust standards [but] does
not create new claims that go beyond existing antitrust standards."70
Part III held that "Verizon's alleged insufficient assistance in the
provision of service to rivals is not a recognized antitrust claim under
[the Supreme] Court's existing refusal-to-deal precedents." 71 Part IV
considered whether to extend the Court's existing refusal-to-deal
precedents to recognize a claim under section 2 of the Sherman Act for
failure to comply with the requirements of the 1996 Act. The Court
concluded that such an extension was unwarranted given the existing
regulatory structure designed to enforce the requirements of the 1996
Act. 72
The Supreme Court majority held and reasoned first, that the
1996 Act did not create a different environment than the customary
67. See Matt Richtel & Andrew Ross Sorkin, Verizon Agrees to Acquire MCI for
$6.6 Billion, Beating Qwest, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2005, at Al; Shawn Young, SBC
Completes AT&T Purchase, Takes New Name, WALL ST. J., Nov. 19, 2005, at A8.
68. See Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S.
398, 402-405 (2004).
69. Id. at 405.
70. Id. at 407.
71. Id. at 410.
72. See id. at 411-12.
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one in the application of antitrust law, in part because the 1996 Act
had an antitrust "saving clause." 73  Second, the Court held that
antitrust law only rarely requires cooperation of a monopolist with
rivals because it can lead to collusion, 74 it may retard innovation, 75
and it may reduce investment.76 Third, the Court noted a difference
that it considered important in comparing Trinko with Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,77 an important earlier Supreme
Court decision on refusal to deal.
The Supreme Court compared Trinko with Aspen Skiing.78 The
facts in Aspen Skiing were as follows: Aspen Skiing Co. controlled
three out of four ski slopes in Aspen, Colorado, with the fourth slope
controlled by Aspen Highlands. 79 For many years, Aspen Skiing and
Aspen Highlands offered a joint ticket so that a buyer would be able to
ski on all four slopes with revenue shared according to use.80 Aspen
Skiing discontinued the joint ticket in 1978-79 and refused to sell its
tickets to Aspen Highlands, even at full retail price, to prevent Aspen
Highlands from bundling them with its own tickets and recreating the
joint ticket that had formerly been available.81 The Supreme Court
ruled that Aspen Skiing's refusal to deal was anti-competitive.8 2
In contrast with Aspen Skiing, the monopolist in Trinko did not
sell or lease the product at issue and then stop selling it or begin
73. See id. at 405-07.
74. Id. at 408 ('Moreover, compelling negotiation between competitors may
facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion.").
75. Id. at 407. ("To safeguard the incentive to innovate, the possession of monopoly
power will not be found unlawful unless it is accompanied by an element of anticompetitive
conduct.").
76. Id. at 414 ("Judicial oversight under the Sherman Act would seem destined to
distort investment and lead to a new layer of interminable litigation, atop the variety of
litigation routes already available to and actively pursued by competitive LECs.").
77. See generally 472 U.S. 585, 600 (1985) (finding significant exclusionary conduct
such as to create an exception to the general "no duty to engage in joint marketing with a
competitor" rule).
78. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 408-10.
79. See Aspen Skiing, 472 U.S. at 587-89.
80. See id. at 590-91.
81. Id. at 592-93.
82. See id. at 610. The Court reasoned:
The refusal to accept the Adventure Pack coupons in exchange for daily tickets
was apparently motivated entirely by a decision to avoid providing any benefit to
Highlands even though accepting the coupons would have entailed no cost to
[Aspen Skiing Co.] itself, would have provided it with immediate benefits, and
would have satisfied its potential customers. Thus the evidence supports an
inference that [Aspen Skiing Co.] was not motivated by efficiency concerns and
that it was willing to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in
exchange for a perceived long-run impact on its smaller rival.
Id. at 610-11.
20071
138 VANDERBILTJ. OF ENTERTAINMENTAND TECH. LAW [Vol. 10:1:121
discriminating against rivals. Instead, the market for leased parts of
the local NET in Trinko was created by regulatory fiat. The Court
noted that "Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of [section] 2
liability."8 3 Finally, the Trinko Court declined to apply the "essential
facilities" doctrine to the facts in Trinko, remarking that there was "no
need either to recognize [the doctrine] or to repudiate it."84 Finally,
the Court stated that it did not want to get involved in detailed
regulatory matters.
8 5
There are a number of aspects of the Supreme Court's decision
that are problematic from an economist's point of view. To start with,
the Court was concerned that negotiations between the contracting
parties (Verizon and AT&T) would result in collusion.8 6 This should
be a general concern, but has no application in this case because, here,
the contracting parties were in purely adversarial positions. Verizon
was in possession of a local NET while AT&T had no local network.
This is the antithesis of the situation faced by sellers of substitutes
where the possibility of collusion exists. Instead, the relationship was
between a buyer and a seller. The FCC noted:
Congress recognized that, because of the incumbent LEC's incentives and superior
bargaining power, its negotiations with new entrants over the terms of such
agreements would be quite different from typical commercial negotiations. As
distinct from bilateral commercial negotiation, the new entrant comes to the table
with little or nothing the incumbent LEC needs or wants.
8 7
Negotiations and contracts between parties in these circumstances do
not typically raise antitrust concerns. Additionally, the parties had an
obligation to negotiate imposed by the 1996 Act, so the Court's concern
seems misguided.
88
The Trinko Court was also concerned that diminished
investment in telecommunications infrastructure would result from
the leasing requirement imposed by the 1996 Act.8 9 In principle, there
should be no such concern from an antitrust point of view. Often,
83. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
84. Id. at 411.
85. See id. at 412-15 (finding that the high costs of judicial oversight outweighed
the "slight benefits of antitrust intervention").
86. See id. at 408 (further noting that "compelling negotiation between competitors
may facilitate the supreme evil of antitrust: collusion").
87. Local Competition Order, supra note 29, at 15,510.
88. See 47 U.S.C. § 251(c)(1) (2000).
89. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 407-08 ("Firms may acquire monopoly power by
establishing an infrastructure that renders them uniquely suited to serve their customers.
Compelling such firms to share the source of their advantage is in some tension with the
underlying purpose of antitrust law, since it may lessen the incentive for the monopolist,
the rival, or both to invest in those economically beneficial facilities.").
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reduced investment can result in higher welfare. 90 Market processes
often help reduce redundant investment to the benefit of society.
Moreover, the 1996 Act was written with a clear understanding that
replication of the local NET was not only inefficient, but prohibitively
uneconomic. Thus, Congress created in the 1996 Act a regulatory
framework that allowed entry and increased competition without any
necessary increase in investment in local telecommunications
infrastructure. In imposing this framework on incumbent LECs
leasing at cost plus a reasonable profit, Congress decided against the
replication of the local NET because it would have been inefficient.
Thus, Congress explicitly chose regulatory rules that would tend to
reduce investment in replicating the existing network infrastructure.91
The Supreme Court noted that the markets for leasing parts of
the local NET were created by the 1996 Act and did not previously
exist voluntarily.92 The Court somehow believed that Verizon's refusal
to deal and its related RRC practices were somehow justified because
infrastructure leasing prices were based on cost plus a reasonable
profit: "Verizon's reluctance to interconnect at the cost-based rate of
compensation available under § 251(c)(3) tells us nothing about
dreams of monopoly."93 But, Verizon was a monopolist in the network
infrastructure and network services markets. 94 Reluctance to sell
leases at above average cost prices is a clear indication that the
monopolist in the network infrastructure market is attempting,
through this action, to prevent entry of others into the network
services market-entry that requires access to the networks
infrastructure market.
The fact that Verizon was obligated to lease local
telecommunications infrastructure at cost plus a reasonable profit,
and did not write such leases at any price earlier, does not imply that
Verizon's refusal to deal and RRC strategies create antitrust liability.
Markets are defined by demand for a service or a product. The fact
that the market for leasing local telecommunications infrastructure
did not exist before the 1996 Act is due to a number of reasons, among
90. For example, society is better off because of resources saved when an
investment in infrastructure is not replicated by many firms but undertaken by only one
firm or a few firms, and other firms are able to rent or lease the infrastructure.
91. Of course, the enhancement of competition in local telecommunications can lead
to increased investment in infrastructure complementary to local telecommunications.
92. See Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409 ("The complaint does not allege that Verizon
voluntarily engaged in a course of dealing with its rivals, or would ever have done so
absent statutory compulsion.").
93. Id.
94. See Nicholas Economides et al., supra note 8, at 3.
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them the fact that competitors likely believed that they would not be
profitable if they leased assets at the monopoly price. The fact that
there was no demand at monopoly prices for such leases, however,
does not imply that there was no demand at any price. The "Law of
Demand" states that higher quantities are demanded at lower prices.
There was significant demand at the "cost plus a reasonable profit"
price imposed by regulation, as evidenced by the entry of AT&T, MCI,
and many smaller companies in local telecommunications following
the 1996 Act. These companies leased the local telecommunications
infrastructure at the "cost plus a reasonable profit" price. It is also
most likely that there would be significant demand at prices above the
''cost plus a reasonable profit" price but not as high as the monopoly
price.95 Thus, the possibility of a market existed before the 1996 Act.
Should we deem that Verizon was justified not to sell or to raise rivals
costs simply because it was denied the monopoly price? There is no
viable economic argument that a refusal to deal at above-cost prices
should per se not raise serious antitrust concerns. The Court should
have ruled that Verizon's refusal to sell at prices above average cost
was anti-competitive.
In comparing Trinko to the Aspen Skiing decision, the Supreme
Court stated: "Aspen Skiing is at or near the outer boundary of
[section] 2 liability."96 Taking that as given, one would expect Trinko
to fall within this outer boundary set by Aspen Skiing. Because
Verizon's price was set by regulation at cost plus a reasonable profit, it
is reasonable to infer that Verizon's price-to-cost margin was lower
than in the duopoly of Aspen Skiing. From the point of view of the
firm committing the anti-competitive act, the incentive seems stronger
for Verizon than for Aspen Skiing. All else being equal, Verizon
should be more likely to refuse to sell than Aspen Skiing Co.
Therefore, if the Supreme Court deems the refusal to deal by a
duopolist in Aspen Skiing anti-competitive, it should find the refusal
to deal by the monopolist in Trinko even more so.
Being forced by regulation to sell below the monopoly price,
and unable to discriminate in price by regulatory restraints, the
monopolist in Trinko had an incentive to raise the costs of its rivals. If
regulation were not present, price discrimination and monopoly
pricing would have likely made RRC strategies sub-optimal from the
95. UNE prices were determined by regulators in each state and differed from state
to state. Often two states with very similar cost characteristics had different UNE lease
prices, and there was significant demand by entrants in both states. It is very unlikely that
any of these prices were below cost. Thus, there is evidence that there was significant
demand not only at cost-based prices but also at higher ones.
96. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 409.
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monopolist's point of view, and they would not have been used. In the
regulatory environment of the 1996 Act, RRC is a natural response of
a monopolist to the restraints of regulation. 97 RRC strategies reduce
competition and social welfare associated with the existence of a free
market. 98 In applying an Aspen Skiing standard, the Trinko Court
erred in not considering the significant difference in incentives of the
potentially liable party between the unregulated environment in
Aspen Skiing and the regulated environment of Trinko.
The Trinko Court stated that it did not want to get involved in
regulatory matters,99 and that is understandable. However, the Court
had already accepted that the savings clause of the 1996 Act allowed
for antitrust law to be applied in parallel with telecommunications
regulation. Therefore, nothing would prevent the Court from
declaring, for example, that Verizon's degradation of service to AT&T
was anti-competitive, accepting the antitrust implications and
avoiding getting the courts involved in regulatory issues. There is a
long tradition of court enforcement of the antitrust laws in
telecommunications, 100 despite the fact that the sector has been
regulated since the 1930s.
The Court missed the vertical leveraging issue in Trinko. That
is, the application of the vertical price squeeze and RRC actions of a
vertically-integrated monopolist that were addressed earlier in the
context of competition in long-distance and the need for line of
business restrictions. The same abstract framework applies. The only
differences are the relevant markets and the names of the players.
Verizon provides two local telecommunications services: (i)
NET services, which it provided to itself and to competitors in local
telecommunications; and (ii) retail services. End-users consume a
composite service comprised of NET services and retail services.
Competitors to Verizon in retail local telecommunications buy only
97. See Nicholas Economides, The Incentive for Non-Price Discrimination by an
Input Monopolist, 16 INT'L J. OF INDUS. ORG. 271, 273 (1998).
98. See generally Thomas G. Krattenmaker & Steven C. Salop, Anticompetitive
Exclusion: Raising Rivals' Costs to Achieve Power Over Price, 96 YALE L.J. 209, 214 (1986)
(outlining a "two-step analysis to estimate the likelihood of anticompetitive effects" when
assessing claims of exclusions); Steven C. Salop & David T. Scheffman, Raising Rivals'
Cost, 73 AM. ECON. REV. 267, 268 (1983) (providing diagrammatic and formal analyses of
strategies to raise rivals' costs).
99. Trinko, 540 U.S. at 402-404.
100. See generally United States v. Am. Tel. & Tel. Co., 552 F. Supp. 131, 224-25
(D.D.C. 1982) (approving an antitrust consent decree, with the modification that the decree
"vest authority in the Court to enforce the provisions and principles of that judgment on its
own").
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NET services from Verizon adding their own retailing services for sale
to end users.
When the 1996 Act was initially implemented, Verizon had a
monopoly in both NET services and retail services. The conduct of
Verizon in Trinko can be seen as the result of Verizon leveraging its
monopoly in NET services to preserve its monopoly in retail services.
This was recognized by the Second Circuit, which noted that Trinko
''may have a monopoly leveraging claim," based on the fact that "the
defendant '(1) possessed monopoly power in one market; (2) used that
power to gain a competitive advantage ... in another distinct market;
and (3) caused injury by such anticompetitive conduct."' 10 1 However,
the Supreme Court dismissed the vertical issue using a fallacious,
circular argument in footnote four of its decision, stating that, "[i]n
any event, leveraging presupposes anticompetitive conduct, which in
this case could only be the refusal-to-deal claim we have rejected."
10 2
Here, the key anti-competitive conduct was the leveraging from NET
services to retailing services, and the Court missed that.
Using the earlier terminology, AB is the monopolized
good/service (NET services), and BC is the downstream good/service
where there is competition after the 1996 Act (retail services, or
RETAIL). Only service ABC (local telecommunications services, or LOCAL)
is demanded by final consumers. All retail service firms, including
Verizon, require the use of NET services to produce local
telecommunications services. Profit maximization at the corporate
level at Verizon implies that NET services are sold within the
company at cost (VERIzONCNET). Thus, Verizon's price (VERIzONPLocAL) for
local telecommunications services to end users is:
VERIZONPLOCAL = VERIZONCNET + VERIZONPRETAIL.
When Verizon sells NET services or leases its network to rivals in the
retailing services market at an above-cost price, i.e.,
VERIZONPNET > VERIZONCNET,
then an equally efficient competitor in retailing, say AT&T, would be
101. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, L.L.P. v. Bell Atl. Corp., 305 F.3d 89, 108 (2d
Cir. 2002) (alteration in original) (quoting Virgin Atl. Airways Ltd. v. British Airways PLC,
257 F.3d 256, 272 (2d Cir. 2001)).
102. Verizon Commc'ns, Inc. v. Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP, 540 U.S. 398,
415 n.4 (2004).
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forced out of business since it would have to charge a higher price
than Verizon to final customers for local telecommunications service.
To see this, assume that AT&T and Verizon are equally
efficient in providing retailing services and charge equal prices for
their retail services, i.e.,
AT&TPRETAIL = VERIZONPRETAIL.
Then, the price that AT&T charges for local telecommunications
services will be higher than Verizon's:
AT&TPLOCAL =-VERIZONPNET + AT&TPRETAIL -
VERIZONPNET + VERIZONPRETAIL
VERIZONCNET + VERIZONPRETAIL = VERIZONPLOCAL.
Therefore, if AT&T leases UNEs or buys NET services from Verizon at
a price above cost, AT&T would be forced to sell local
telecommunications services above the price at which Verizon sells
them:
AT&TPLOCAL > VERIZONPLOCAL.
In this way, AT&T or any other rival in local telecommunications who
has to lease UNEs from Verizon can be foreclosed, provided that
Verizon can price UNEs above cost.
Alternatively, now assume that Verizon is forced by regulators
to lease UNEs and sell NET services at cost. Verizon can use RRC
strategies towards its competitors in retailing services, such as delays
and quality decreases, so that it increases the effective cost of NET
services to them to the level vERIzoNP.RRCNET,10 3 which is above its cost
for such services:
VERIZONP.RRCNET > VERIZONCNET.
Then, using the same argument as in the AT&T 1981 divestiture,
equally efficient retailing competitors, faced with higher effective costs
for NET services, will have to charge a higher price than Verizon's
VERIzoNPLOcAL, and will therefore be foreclosed from retail services
market.
103. VERIZoNP.RRCNET is the effective cost of NET services faced by Verizon local
service rivals as a result of Verizon's RRC actions.
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That is, a rival that is equally efficient with Verizon in
retailing,
AT&TPRETAILING = VERIZONPRETAILING,
will be forced to sell local telecommunications services at a higher
price that Verizon:
AT&TPLOCAL = VERIZONP.RRCNET + AT&TPRETAIL -
VERIZONP.RRCNET + VERIZONPRETAIL
VERIZONCNET + VERIZONPRETAIL = VERIZoNPLoCAL.
It follows that, when Verizon implements RRC strategies, AT&T is
forced to sell local telecommunications services to final consumers
above the price at which Verizon sells them:
AT&TPLOCAL > VERIZONPLOCAL.
In summary, Verizon can use RRC strategies to leverage its
monopoly in NET services so that it forecloses its competitors in the
local telecommunications services market. Moreover, Verizon has an
incentive to do so, since this strategy allows it to maintain its
profitable monopoly in local telecommunications services. Also, note
that the RRC strategy can be used in addition to yield an increase in
the price of NET services and that these two strategies are not in
conflict with each other from Verizon's point of view.
III. THE PROFIT SACRIFICE PRINCIPLE AND ITS APPLICATION IN TRINKO
The Supreme Court in Trinko did not state a rule under which
specific conduct will be found to be "willful monopolization." In its
brief, the government proposed such a standard be based on the
"sacrifice principle."10 4 I define the sacrifice principle as follows: a
defendant is liable for anticompetitive behavior if its conduct "involves
a sacrifice of short-term profits or goodwill that makes sense only
insofar as it helps the defendant maintain or obtain monopoly
power."0 5 This definition only partially coincides with the definition
104. Brief for the United States and the FTC as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner
at 16, Trinko, 540 U.S. 398 (No. 02-682).
105. As the Government's brief notes, the sacrifice principle has been used by courts
in various versions. See id. (citing Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472
U.S. 585, 610-11 (1985) (finding sufficient evidence to infer that the defendant was "willing
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of the same principle in the Government's brief in Trinko.
Specifically, the Government's definition allows all behavior that does
not involve sacrifice of short-term profits to be characterized as not
"exclusionary" and not "predatory."10 6  I disagree. Conduct can be
exclusionary even without a sacrifice of short-term profits. However,
when such a sacrifice is observed, it indicates directly that this
conduct is anti-competitive.
I am not endorsing the sacrifice principle as a single criterion
to be used in ascertaining anti-competitive behavior since there can be
cases where there is no sacrifice of short-term profits. However, such
conduct does not make sense except as a means to attain or retain
monopoly power. It is clear that, if an action involving a sacrifice of
short-term profits cannot be justified, except to the extent that it helps
a company to create, protect, or enhance monopoly power, there is
little doubt that such an action is anti-competitive.
10 7
The vertical leveraging in Trinko passes the "sacrifice test." The
behavior of Verizon to raise the costs of rivals in local
telecommunications services entailed a sacrifice of profits from
potential leasing of UNEs. This sacrifice would not have occurred if
Verizon were not trying to protect its monopoly in the retail market
for local telecommunications services. Thus, in applying the sacrifice
principle, Verizon's actions are anti-competitive.
If Verizon did not have a retail division, it would have no
incentive to foreclose or disadvantage independent retail firms.
Instead, if its strategy were not to preserve its monopoly position in
to sacrifice short-run benefits and consumer goodwill in exchange for a perceived long-run
impact on its smaller rival"); Stearns Airport Equip. Co. v. FMC Corp., 170 F.3d 518, 524
n.3 (5th Cir. 1999) (noting exclusionary conduct that "harmed the monopolist and could
only be understood when one recognized that competitors suffered more severe harm");
Advanced Health-Care Servs., Inc. v. Radford Cmty. Hosp., 910 F.2d 139, 148 (4th Cir.
1990) (defining predation as conduct that "has harmed consumers and competition by
making a short-term sacrifice in order to further its exclusive, anti-competitive objectives");
Gen. Indus. Corp. v. Hartz Mountain Corp., 810 F.2d 795, 803 (8th Cir. 1987) (noting that
conduct is anticompetitive if its "anticipated benefits were dependent upon its tendency to
discipline or eliminate competition and thereby enhance the firm's long term ability to reap
the benefits of monopoly power")).
106. See id. at 15 ("[Clonduct is not exclusionary or predatory unless it would make
no economic sense for the defendant but for its tendency to eliminate or lessen
competition.").
107. It should also be noted that changes in total welfare or total surplus realized
from a market-the sum of profits of all firms in the market plus consumers' surplus,
where consumers' surplus represents the difference between the total willingness to pay for
a certain number of units by consumers and the amount they actually pay-do not
generally coincide with changes in profits of a dominant firm. Thus, a change in profits by
one firm, even a monopolist, does not, in general, correspond to a corresponding equal
change in welfare, or even a change in welfare in the same direction as the profit change.
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the retail market, Verizon would have had every incentive to sell its
NET services to all at prices above cost, as mandated by the 1996 Act.
Since Verizon sells its NET services to its retail division at cost, while
the price for any NET services sold to third parties includes a
reasonable profit, according to the 1996 Act's rules, RRC actions that
disadvantage third-party retailing service firms and result in smaller
sales of NET services to these firms clearly impose a sacrifice of profits
for Verizon. Therefore, the sacrifice principle can be applied in the
Trinko case, in the same way that the Supreme Court articulated it in
Aspen Skiing, to conclude that Verizon's RRC actions result in a short-
term sacrifice of profits. It follows that these actions by Verizon would
not have been taken except to preserve its monopoly.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court's economic reasoning in the Trinko
decision has a number of defects from an economist's point of view.
The decision is likely to enhance and preserve the monopoly of Verizon
and the other RBOCs who remain near-monopolists in local
telecommunications markets. The Supreme Court missed the
leveraging of monopoly power-from the NET market to the retail
telecommunications market-that Verizon engaged in to foreclose
competition in the retail telecommunications market. Additionally,
the Supreme Court used the fact that the leasing market for parts of
the NET did not exist before being mandated by the 1996 Act to find
that Verizon did not have antitrust liability. This is problematic as
technological change can create new markets where none existed
before, and the earlier non-existence of markets should not be used as
an escape from antitrust law.
The Supreme Court decided Trinko in the context of Aspen
Skiing, where regulation was absent. However, the use of non-price
strategies to raise rivals' costs is particularly important in Trinko
because of the price regulation imposed by the 1996 Act. Even in the
context of Aspen Skiing, the Court erred in not allowing the logic of
Aspen Skiing to be applied to Trinko. The Court had applied the
sacrifice principle in Aspen Skiing, showing that Aspen Skiing's
actions had sacrificed short-term profits. It is clear that Verizon's
actions in Trinko caused the company to lease less infrastructure at
above-cost prices and, therefore, to incur a profits sacrifice in violation
of antitrust law. Therefore, the Trinko Court improperly failed to
apply the same principle from Aspen Skiing.
